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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude
Rhoades, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14159
v.
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death
of Claude Rhoades.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash
service of process, held that attachment is an improper
method to confer jurisdiction in a wrongful death case
where the tort sued upon arose in another state and pursuant
to this holding granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to
vacate the writ of attachment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the
lower court reversed, the writ of attachment reinstated and
the case remanded for a trial on the merits.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts giving rise to this case are as follows:
Plaintiff's decedent, Claude Rhoades, lived about
three-quarters of a mile on the Utah side of the UtahColorado border.

He was a farmer and farmed land that he

owned in Utah and land that he leased in Utah and Colorado.
(R.44)
Defendant James Wright lived about two miles on the
Colorado side of the Colorado-Utah border with his parents,
Clifford Wright and Essie Wright, who are also Defendants.
James Wright farmed land belonging to himself and his
parents, both in Colorado and Utah.
parties were in close proximity.

The properties of the

(R.44)

Claude Rhoades had been married to a cousin of James
Wright, from whom he was divorced in 1966.

The property

settlement provided that Anita, the first Mrs. Rhoades, was
to receive a share of the profits from crops grown on certain
land.

The parties had been keeping an eye on each other as

regards the success or failure of the crops, who visited
whom and so on.

(R.44-45)

In the late afternoon of April 19, 1970, the parties
were all inspecting portions of their farmland, Claude
Rhoades with his second wife, Mildred Rhoades, Appellant
herein, and James Wright with his parents, Clifford and
Essie Wright.

Claude Rhoades overtook the Wrights and
': ' 2
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pulled his pickup over in such a way as to make them stop.
He and Appellant got out of the truck and approached the
Wright vehicle on the driver's side.

Claude Rhoades spoke

to James Wright words to the effect of "Get off my back."
Thereupon, James Wright shot and killed Claude Rhoades.

At

the time of the shooting, the parties were on the Colorado
side of the Utah-Colorado border.

(R.45)

After James Wright was found guilty of first degree
murder by a Colorado court and jury and was sentenced to
life imprisonment, he transferred his Utah property to his
parents for no consideration.

(R.45)

Plaintiff then filed

this wrongful death action in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, as a
diversity action.
in Colorado.

The Defendants were served with process

The Plaintiff also sought and obtained a writ

of attachment on the Utah property that James Wright had
transferred to his parents.

(R.45)

The United States District Court found, based on the
Utah long-arm statute, that the court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
interlocutory appeal.

The case was then certified for

(R.46)

The federal district court's conclusion that there
was personal jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 Supp., 78-27-24, was based on its
view that economic injury in Utah which resulted from the
3
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shooting in Colorado was sufficient to support such
jurisdiction.

The trial court also stated that the exercise

of jurisdiction would not violate due process standards
because it was reasonably foreseeable that the act would
cause injury in Utah and it was fair in view of the contacts
the Defendant had with Utah.

(R.46)

The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
reversed the decision of the district court, with directions
to dismiss the action by reason of lack of personal jurisdiction for the reason that the Utah long-arm statute does not
contemplate "economic injury" as a basis for personal
jurisdiction.

(R.47-48)

The circuit court further held that jurisdiction could
not be sustained by the attachment of Defendant's property
in Utah for the same reason that the matter of "injury to
the person" or "personal injury" is required rather than
"economic injury."

(R.48-49)

The Tenth Circuit decision

was filed July 23, 1973.
Effective November 1, 1972, subsequent to the ruling
of the United States District Court, and while that decision
was before the circuit court on appeal, Rule 64C(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, was amended by this Court to read
as follows:

(R.32)

(a) The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of
the complaint . . . in an action against a nonresident of this state, may have the property of the
4
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defendant, not exempt from execution, attached as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered in such action. . . . (Emphasis
added)
The amendment substituted the phrase "against a non-resident"
for the phrase "to recover damages for any tort committed
by a non-resident of this state against the person or
property of a resident of this state" near the beginning of
the rule,

(R.32)

On July 29, 1974, Plaintiff-Appellant filed her
complaint herein individually and as Administratrix of the
Estate of Claude Rhoades, deceased.

(R.l)

Without discussing the effect of the amendment to Rule
64C(a), the lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash
service of process on the Defendants, stating as its reason
the fact that the Defendants are all residents of Colorado
and were served in that state and Utah's long-arm statute
does not offer a basis for in personam jurisdiction where
the claim is for economic injury.

(R.61-62)

In addition, the trial court found that attachment is
an improper method to confer jurisdiction in a wrongful
death case where the tort sued upon arose in another state
and therefore concluded that it did not have in rem
jurisdiction.

(R.62)

The district court further found that

the prior decision of the federal circuit court regarding
jurisdiction "may not be res judicata by reason of the
amendment which has been made" by this Court to Rule 64C(a).
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Subsequently, on ex parte motion of Defendants, and
by order dated June 3, 1975, the lower court vacated the
writ of attachment herein, stating that the writ was
"without legal significance as far as a means of conferring
in rem jurisdiction" on the court by virtue of the court's
order and decision dated May 21, 1975.

(R.64-65)

ISSUES
1.

Rule 64C(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

entitles the Plaintiff in this action to attach the property
of Defendants within the State of Utah and confers in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction on the Utah courts, by virtue
of Plaintiff's attachment and action, to determine the
rights of Defendants in the subject property.
2.

The federal court's decision that it lacked

jurisdiction is not res judicata as to the instant action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RULE 64C(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ENTITLES
THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION TO ATTACH THE PROPERTY OF
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH AND CONFERS IN REM OR
QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION ON THE UTAH COURTS, BY VIRTUE OF
PLAINTIFF'S ATTACHMENT AND ACTION, TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTS
OF DEFENDANTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part as follows:
6
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(a) The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of
the complaint . . • in an action against a non-resident
of this state, may have the property of the defendant,
not exempt from execution, attached as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
in such action. . . . (Emphasis added)
The amendment to Rule 64C(a), effective November 1,
1972, substituted "against a non-resident" for "to recover
damages for any tort committed by a non-resident of this
state against the person or property of a resident of this
state."

It is Plaintiff's position that the Utah Supreme

Court intended to broaden the scope of the attachment rule
to include "economic injury."
Rule 64C(a) as amended is consistent with the trend
in other states to extend jurisdiction to allow a resident
to recover in the courts of his own state in any action
against a non-resident not amenable to process in that state,
where the defendant owns property within the state and where
the cause of action, regardless of whether it sounds in tort
or contract, may have arisen in another state.

See N.Y. Civ.

Prac. Act, §6201 (1963); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966); 111. Ann. Stat. C. 11
§11 (1963); Ind. Ann. Stat. 34-1-11-1 [ 3-501] (1946)
See, also, Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn.
1973); Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1973); Forbes v. Boynton,

N.H.

, 313 A.2d

129 (1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. §571.41 subd. 2 (Supp. 1974).
The law of attachment varies from state to state.
7
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Several generalizations are possible, however, because of
the common historical development of the remedy.

Attachment

is the process by which property is brought into the custody
of the court.

It is used both as a means of securing a

potential judgment debt and as a means of acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant to the extent of the
property attached.

Both of these aspects are relied upon

in the present action.

If the Plaintiff's claim matures

into a judgment, the court may cause Defendants' attached
property to be sold to satisfy the judgment.

In this manner

the Plaintiff effectively acquires jurisdiction over the
Defendants who may otherwise not be amenable to process in
the state.
The right of a state, through its tribunals, to subject
property situated within its limits, owned by non-residents,
to the payment of demands against them and the fact that this
jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of
the state where the owners are domiciled are too well
established to admit of argument; and attachment laws
directed against citizens of other states have been declared
by uniform course of decisions to be valid and not in
conflict with constitutional guarantees.

6 AM. JUR. 2d,

Attachment and Garnishment, §219 (2d Ed. 1963).
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877),
the Supreme Court held that a state may subject property
8
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situated in its territory, but owned by non-residents, to
the payment of claims by its own citizens.

This jurisdiction

affecting non-residents was found permissible because it did
not infringe upon the sovereignty of the state in which the
owner was domiciled.

The court also recognized the interest

of each state in the protection of its own citizens.

These

two factors were found to legitimate the exercise of authority
of a state to hold and appropriate for the satisfaction of
claims of residents1 property owned by non-residents.

The

due process standard for the assertion of jurisdiction
formulated in Pennoyer provides a reliable objective test
for determining whether any particular exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional.

Where the property attached is

physically located within the state, the due process requirement is satisfied.
In a sense, when the Supreme Court approved this
practice in Pennoyer, it made the attachment statutes the
first long-arm statutes.
The doctrine has now been extended to authorize courts
to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by attaching as property
of a non-resident his right under a liability policy to have
his insurer defend and indemnify him on his claim.

Seider v.

feoth, supra; Rintala v. Shoemaker, supra; Forbes v. Boynton,
supra.
It is not necessary to personally serve the defendants
9
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in order to acquire in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
over defendants1 property located within the state.

In the

present case, the Defendants were given notice, by means of
personal service of the complaint upon them, that their
property had been attached and that a proceeding in rem or
quasi-in-rem had been commenced against their property to
satisfy Plaintiff's claim.

For that reason, it was error

for the court to quash service of process, even though
personal service may have failed to confer personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
In their memorandum submitted to the court below, the
Defendants relied upon the case of Alpers v. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Company, 403 Pa. 626, 130 A.2d 360 (1961), as
authority for their argument that because the cause of action
arose in another state, Utah is precluded from using Rule
64C(a) as a means of conferring in rem or quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction.

(R.25)

In stating their argument, Defendants

conceded that they had found only limited authority on this
proposition.

(R.25)

In the Alpers case, the plaintiff, a resident of
Pennsylvania, was injured in New Jersey in an automobile
accident allegedly caused by a truck owned by defendant and
driven by one of its employees.

Plaintiff attached the

property of defendant in Pennsylvania and brought an action
for damages.

Defendant appeared specially for purposes of
10
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contesting jurisdiction, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's ruling dismissing the writ of
attachment, stating that the attachment remedy will not lie
for torts committed outside the boundaries of the State of
Pennsylvania.
In stating the facts of the Alpers case, the Defendants
ignored the fact that that decision was based on a 1937
Pennsylvania statutory provision which limited writs of
foreign attachment to torts committed within the State of
Pennsylvania.

That decision was subsequently criticized in

a persuasive law review comment.

That comment cited a

Pennsylvania statute that authorizes the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania to prescribe forms of action, writs and other
rules of civil procedure for the courts of Pennsylvania.
See Vol. XIX Washington and Lee Law Review, Attachment for
a Foreign Tort, p.267 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 §61
(Supp. 1960).

Under this statutory authority, the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania adopted its Rule 1252 which provides
in part that a writ of foreign attachment may issue to attach
property of a defendant upon any cause of action at law or
in equity in which the relief sought includes a judgment or
decree for the payment of money.

The author of that article

further commented that Pennsylvania's Rule 1252 does not
affect any fundamental change in the basic requirements for
proceeding by attachment.

Prior to obtaining a writ of
11
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foreign attachment in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant is a non-resident of the state and that
tangible property belonging to the defendant is within the
forum when the attachment is served upon the garnishee.
Upon meeting these requirements, the writ of foreign attachment will issue and a suit quasi in rem is formally instituted
whereby the plaintiff may proceed against the property of
the defendant, rather than against the defendant's person.
The author suggested that the doctrine of forum non-conveniens
could be applied by the court to effectively control the use
of the writ of attachment in actions to recover for foreign
torts and further commented as follows:
At the same time, the plaintiff who asserts a good
cause of action and seeks recovery by attachment would
not be denied all access to the courts of Pennsylvania.
It would seem that under the Alpers decision, a
resident must either seek recovery in personam within
or without the commonwealth since there is little
chance the plaintiff can obtain personal service upon
the foreign defendant. The desirability of reducing
burdensome litigation does not appear to warrant the
harsh restriction that denies the fundamental quasi
in rem action, especially when the same results may
be more equitably achieved by a discretionary use of
the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.
The efficacy and desirability of the writ of foreign
attachment as extended to foreign actions ex delicto
has been well recognized and accepted in other jurisdictions. It is submitted that a decision interpreting
Rule 1252 so as to extend to foreign actions ex delicto
would have been preferable. The application of the
rule could then have been made to depend on the
discretionary doctrine of forum non-conveniens. See
Volume XIX, Washington and Lee Law Review, Attachment
for a Foreign Tort, at pages 270-271 (1962).
12
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The Utah Supreme Court is authorized by Section 78-2-4,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), to:
. . . [P]rescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all
courts of the State of Utah, the forms of process,
writs, pleadings and motions and the practice and
procedure in all civil and criminal actions and
proceedings. . . . Such rules may not abridge, enlarge
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
Unlike the State of Pennsylvania, Utah does not have a
statute which limits writs of foreign attachment to torts
committed within the state.

There is no basis for holding

that Rule 64C(a) does not allow such a practice.

The rule

is broad and unrestricted in that regard.
This Court has long recognized the principle of in
rem jurisdiction with regard to attachment proceedings.

In

the case of Bristol v. Brent, 36 Utah 108, 103 Pac. 1076
(1909)f

the court held as follows with regard to attachment

proceedings against a non-resident defendant and in rem
jurisdiction:
In attachment proceedings against a non-resident
defendant where prsonal service on him is lacking, it
is elementary that the court must obtain jurisdiction
of the property of the defendant. This in an ordinary
attachment is obtained by seizure of it by the officer,
and the seizure places the property in the custody of
the law to be so held until the court determines
whether or not the plaintiff in the action is entitled
to judgment in the main case. When this is determined
and judgment is entered, then, and then only, can the
property that has been seized be applied to the payment
of the judgment.
* * *

A proceeding by which jurisdiction is sought by
13
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attaching property, whether tangible or intangible,
such as a debt, is essentially a proceeding in rem;
that is, a proceeding against a thing which is brought
into the custody of the law and hence-within the
jurisdiction of the court. To place it into the
custody of law and bring it within the jurisdiction of
the court, the things which the law requires to be
done must be done.
See, also, 6 AM. JUR. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment,
§14, §16, §219 (2d Ed. 1963).
The Affidavit for Attachment in the present action
clearly states a basis for in rem jurisdiction as follows:
And this affiant further states that the following
cause for issuing an attachment in this action actually
exists at the time of taking this affidavit, to-wit:
That the said defendants are non-residents of the
State of Utah; that the defendant James C. Wright has
assigned and disposed of real property in the State
of Utah with intent to defraud his creditors; and that
unless this attachment issue, said defendants, and
each of them, will further attempt to assign and
transfer real property located in the State of Utah
for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the
obligation herein sued upon, and particularly the
obligation owing to plaintiff; that in order to obtain
jurisdiction of the matter, it is necessary that the
court issue a writ of attachment, retaining and holding
in tact said property for the purpose of satisfying in
whole or in part any judgment which may be rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, or either
of them. (R.56)
The complaint of Plaintiff also clearly states a cause
of action sounding in rem or quasi-in-rem against the
Defendants and their property.

(R.l-3)

For the above stated reasons, it was error for the
trial court to hold that Plaintiff's attachment failed to
confer in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on the court and
the court improperly granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to
14
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vacate the writ of attachment.
POINT II
THE FEDERAL COURT'S DECISION THAT IT LACKED JURISDICTION IS
NOT RES JUDICATA AS TO THE INSTANT ACTION.
The general rule is that a judgment for the defendant
based on lack of jurisdiction does not bar the plaintiff
from bringing another action on the same cause in another
court having jurisdiction.

46 AM. JUR. 2df Judgments, §500,

p.656 (2d Ed. 1969).
46 AM. JUR. 2d, supra, further states the law as follows:
. . . [E]ven though a judgment disposes of the action
without a determination of the merits of the cause of
action, it is nevertheless conclusive as to the issues
or technical points actually decided therein, and this
rule has been applied to a judgment based on want of
jurisdiction, so as to render conclusive the prior
court's determination of its lack of jurisdiction, as
well as questions material to the issue of jurisdiction
and actually decided by the judgment. Under this rule,
a subsequent action by and against the same parties on
the same cause in the same court is barred, but the
maintenance of a subsequent action in another court is
not precluded by a prior judgment based on the
determination of a lack of jurisdiction, even if such
determination is erroneous, although, as to this precise
point, there is some authority to the contrary.
(Emphasis added)
Of course, a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction
does not preclude a party from litigating in another
action a question not determined by the judgment, such
as a jurisdictional question not identical with the
one decided by the former judgment. . . . (Emphasis
added)
Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.

As stated in many cases, the doctrine
15
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of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered
upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action
and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties
and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.

46 AH JUR, supra

There is no issue or matter now before this Court that
has been decided by prior judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
As noted previously, the circuit court merely held
that the federal district Court lacked personal jurisdiction

I
1

over the Defendants to the extent personal jurisdiction was
sought under Utah's long-arm statute.

The court also found

that "jurisdiction" could not be sustained by the attachment

i
of Defendants' property under Utah's attachment Rule 64C
[as that rule read prior to amendment].

I
1

The lower court in the present action found that the
prior decision of the federal court in this case regarding

]

jurisdiction may not be res judicata by reason of the amendment which has been made by this Court to Rule 64C(a).

I

(R.63)

i

Then, without citing any authority, the lower court

found that attachment is an improper method to confer
jurisdiction in a wrongful death case where the tort sued
upon arose in another state.

(R.62-63)

I

The rest of the

1
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|

i
i

arm statute which has no application in the present action.
(R.61-62)
Defendants in their memorandum of authorities before
the lower court present considerable argument on the questions
of res judicata and interpretation of the Utah long-arm
statute, both of which are without merit under the facts of
this case.
Plaintiff in the present action claims nothing by way
of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants by virtue of
Utah's long-arm statute.

Admittedly, if Plaintiff were so

asserting, the same may be res judicata since the federal
court already decided that question.

The federal court also

interpreted Rule 64C(a) as it read prior to amendment and
did so in connection with its interpretation of the Utah
long-arm statute.

The federal court concluded that neither

the long-arm statute nor Rule 64C(a)[as it then read]
included economic injury.
A.

A change in the law between the commencement

dates of the federal action and the state action precludes
the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
It is a well established principal of law that a
change in circumstances, either law or fact, precludes
application of the doctrine of res judicata.
50 C.J.S., Judgments, §650, p.95, states the law as
follows:
17
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In accordance with the general rule stated supra this
section that the estoppel of a judgment extends only
to the facts and conditions as they were at the time
the judgment was rendered, it has been broadly held
that res judicata is no defense where, between the
time of the first judgment and the second, there has
been an intervening decision or a change in the law
creating an altered situation, as where the second suit
seeks an adjudication of rights under a statute enacted
subsequent to the determination of the first action.
Accord 49 ALR2d 1036, 1039-40;
Consequently, the judgment is conclusive in another
proceeding as to questions material to the jurisdiction
of the court rendering it, but it is not conclusive .
. . where, subsequently to the rendition of the
judgment, there has been a change . . . in the governing
statutes or rules of court.
As already discussed, Rule 64C(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, was amended between the commencement of the federal
court action and the commencement of the instant state court
action.

For that reason, the federal court decision inter-

preting the old Rule 64C(a) in connection with the long-arm
statute has no binding effect on the present action which
was initiated under the new Rule 64C(a).
It is also the general rule that amendments to
procedural statutes will be liberally construed.

1A Souther-

land Statutory Construction, §22.9 (4th Ed. 1972).
In the absence of a saving clause or statute or some
other clear indication that legislative intent is to the
contrary, provisions added by the amendment that affect
procedural rights—legal remedies—are construed to apply
to all cases pending at the time of its enactment and all
18
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those commenced subsequent thereto, whether the substantive
right sought to be enforced thereby accrued prior or subsequent to the amendment, unless a vested right would thereby
be impaired.

1A Southerland Statutory Construction, §22.36

(4th Ed. 1972).
A fortiori, a statutory amendment which furnishes a
new remedy, but does not impair or affect any contractual
obligations or disturb any vested rights, is applicable to
proceedings begun after its passage, though relating to an
accident previous thereto.

73 AM. JUR. 2d, Statutes, §354

(2d Ed. 1974) .
In Shelby-Downard Asphalt Co. v. Enyart, 670 Okl. 237,
170 Pac. 708 (1918), the plaintiff brought the same action
three different times against defendant for personal injuries
sustained in a construction accident.

All three actions

were commenced in the same county, the situs of the injury.
Action No. 1 was commenced in March, 1912, and on defendant's
motion to quash service of process the court ruled that it
lacked in personam jurisdiction over defendant and dismissed
the action without prejudice.

The basis for the court's

decision was an Oklahoma statute permitting a plaintiff to
bring a personal injury action against a corporation only
in the county where the defendant corporation has its
principal place of business, which in that case happened to
be a county other than the county where the injury took
19
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place.

In August, 1912, plaintiff commenced Action No. 2,

identical to Action No. 1, in the same county; and the court
dismissed it again for the same reason.

Then, in March,

1913, the foregoing statute was amended in order to permit
actions against corporations to be commenced in the county
where the plaintiff was injured.

Plaintiff then commenced

Action No. 3, identical to Actions Nos. 2 and 3 except for
the change in the statutory law; and this time the court
denied defendant's motion to quash.

The Oklahoma Supreme

Court affirmed, holding the amendment procedural, and therefore retroactive in application, and also holding that the
change in the law precluded defendant from successfully
asserting the doctrine of res judicata as a bar to the suit.
Hence, under the well-established rule that a statute
which applies to procedure only should be given a
retrospective effect, unless it appears that the
Legislature intended it should operate prospectively
only, we think this act should be construed to embrace
causes of action existing at the time the act went
into effect, as well as those that should arise thereafter.
The plaintiff in error next contends that it was res
adjudicata for the court to assume jurisdiction of
this case in Osage County after it had previously
entered a judgment dismissing the case, on the ground
that Osage County was the wrong venue. But this
contention is not tenable. For it does not follow
that because Osage County was the wrong venue at the
time the first action was commenced, that Enyart would
be precluded from bringing the action again in the
same county, provided conditions so changed as to make
that the proper venue. . . . And . . . the procedure
so changed while the cause of action was still alive
as to make Osage County the proper venue. And under
these conditions the court, in passing upon the motion
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to dismiss in the instant case, had an entirely
different question before it to that presented by the
motion to dismiss in the former case. 170 Pac. at 710.
In the case of Barry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d
1010 (1961), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the redefinition of the practice of dentistry was within the police power
of the legislature and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or deprive dental technicians of a valuable property
right without due process.

In reaching this result, the

court also found that the doctrine of res judicata is not
applicable where the law under which the first adjudication
was obtained was different from that applicable to the second
action;
The contention by appellants that the doctrine of res
judicata is applicable here by reason of Barry v.
Summers, supra, is without merit. This court there
considered the 19 53 amendment and held it unconstitutional. The present action concerns the provisions
of . . . amending the definition of "practice of
dentistry.11 The previous case cannot be expanded to
prohibit subsequent legislative action. The doctrine
of res judicata is not applicable where the law under
which the first adjudication was obtained is different
from that applicable to the second action.
Rule 64C(a), a procedural rule, applies to all actions
pending at the time it was amended, as well as to actions
commenced after its amendment.
In

Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 (1974),

one of the issues was whether Rule 64C (f) (1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure applied retroactively.

The facts

indicate that plaintiff had attached defendant's property
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in August, 1972.

Defendant furnished a $10,000.00 bond and

in March, 1973, made a motion to release his property.
trial court granted the motion.

The

Plaintiff objected to the

motion, arguing that defendant was required to furnish a
bond equal in value to the property to be released, which
was approximately $170,000.00.

The basis of the controversy

was an amendment to Rule 64C(f), issued by the Utah Supreme
Court on November 1, 1972, stating that a defendant must
furnish a bond "in a sum not less than the value of the
property to be released," which supplanted the former maximum
$10,000.00 requirement.
applied retroactively.

Plaintiff argued the amendment
The trial court ruled for defendant,

but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
Rule 64C(f), U.R.C.P., is primarily designed to secure
plaintiff's claim; the provision in the former rule,
limiting the maximum value of defendant's bond, does
not appear within the context of the rule to confer a
substantive right upon the defendant. The trial court
erred in its ruling that the amended rule was not
applicable in the instant action. 519 P.2d 239.
Applying the court's reasoning to the amendment to
Rule 64C(a), the former provision does not appear to confer
a substantive right upon the defendant that would be impaired
by retrospective application of the amendment.

The amendment

clarifies the original intent of the rule and provides
Plaintiff with a forum in which to pursue her claim.
Along a similar vein are those cases holding that the
long-arm statutes apply retroactively.

Such cases are
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particularly relevant to the instant case because they stand
for the proposition that a statute that provides more
circumstances for in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is retroactive in effect.
In the case of Merme's v. Weeden and Co., 8 Ariz. App.
166, 444 P.2d 524 (1968), the Arizona Supreme Court held
that the New York long-arm statute has retroactive effect.
That case concerned a dispute over the sale of stock.

The

court held as follows:
The above-mentioned statute was to become effective
September 1, 196 3. The sale of the stock in question
occurred the previous April of 196 3. The first question,
therefore, would be to determine whether the act applies
to the instant case. We believe so. The New York
court has held that the statute is procedural and one
which merely makes available an additional forum to
plaintiff to enforce whatever substantive right he
might have against a defendant, and, as such, may be
applied retroactively. 444 P.2d at 526.
Accord, Gordon v. Granstedt, 513 P.2d 165 (Hawaii 1973).
The same function is being served by Rule 64C(a), as
amended.

It merely adds an additional circumstance, that

of "economic injury," to those of direct injuries to person
or property, under which plaintiffs can obtain quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.

It also eliminates

bothersome language which might be construed to restrict the
attachment remedy and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to actions
arising within the state.

The new Rule 64C(a) imposes no

restrictions in that regard and clearly applies to actions
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arising in other states.
CONCLUSION

*

It was error for the court below to grant Defendants'
motion to quash service of process for the reason that
personal service was necessary to give the Defendants notice
that their property had been attached and that a proceeding
in rem or quasi-in-rem had been commenced against the property
to satisfy the claim of Plaintiff,
The lower court likewise erred by granting Defendants1
ex parte motion to vacate the writ of attachment.
Based on the foregoing argument, Plaintiff had a valid
writ of attachment by virtue of which quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was conferred on the court to determine the interest of
Plaintiff in Defendants1 property pursuant to Plaintiff's
claim.
If this Court were to hold otherwise, Plaintiff would
be denied her only remaining forum, since the statute of
limitations has run in Colorado and Colorado does not have
a savings clause similar to Utah, with regard to the statute
of limitations applicable to wrongful death actions. This
matter was decided by the Colorado court on April 16, 1975,
in an action almost identical to the present action, filed
by the Plaintiff in Dolores County, Colorado, on July 29,
1974.

Plaintiff's case has yet to be heard on the merits.
This is certainly a case which warrants liberal
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interpretation of Rule 64C(a) in view of the many contacts
of Defendants with Utah, the close proximity of the parties1
properties and the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable
that Defendant's act would cause injury in Utah.
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in the Utah court in this
action in no way infringes upon the sovereignty of Colorado.
It recognizes the interest of Utah in the protection of its
own citizens.

These two factors legitimate the exercise of

authority by Utah to hold and appropriate for the satisfaction
of Plaintiff's claim property owned by non-residents where
that property is physically present in Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
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